



E IN ECONOMICS 
The People's 
Professor 
Prakash Loungani profiles 
Joseph Stiglitz 
"THE most misunderstood 
man in America"—that's 
what Newsweek called Jo¬
seph Stiglitz in an article 
this year. The 2001 Nobel Laureate in eco¬
nomics "can't get any respect at home," the 
magazine said, adding that " in Washington 
he's seen as just another economic critic and 
not always a welcome one." Outside his na¬
tive United States, Stiglitz gets quite a dif¬
ferent reception—in many countries he is 
treated like an oracle. Luckily, jokes Stiglitz, 
he spends a fair bit of his time these days 
outside the United States: " M y passport is so 
thick that sometimes I'm questioned about 
whether it's real." 
Stiglitz isn't surprised by his lack of popu¬
larity in Washington. He says it's because he 
has always taken the side of the "little guy" 
against the financial elites and their cham¬
pions. It's the theme that runs through his 
life's work. The academic work that earned 
him his Nobel focused on cases where one 
side in a transaction had less information 
than the other, leading to market outcomes 
that were often patently unfair. When he 
dove into policymaking in the 1990s, first 
on President Clinton's Council of Economic 
Advisers (CEA) and then as chief economist 
at the World Bank, he continued to take on 
"lawyers and investment bankers and eco¬
nomic superpowers" to defend the cause of 
the global citizen. As Jonathan Chait wrote in 
The American Prospect a decade ago, Stiglitz 
"remains a professor, not a player . . . . A n d 
yet, somehow, the issues he cares about most 
always make it onto the agenda." 
Rabbi Joe 
Stiglitz grew up in Gary, Indiana, the home¬
town of another economics Nobel Laureate, 
Paul Samuelson. His family provided h im 
with an early education in doing the right 
thing. His mother taught in a public school, 
2 Finance & Development December 2009 
a white teacher in a school with pre¬
dominantly African-American kids. 
His father told him about the moral 
and legal importance of paying the 
household help's social security— 
Stiglitz says that listening to his fa¬
ther "saved me a lot of trouble when 
I was up for Senate confirmation" 
as C E A chairman. A n d he fondly 
remembers an uncle who, though a 
successful businessman, was critical 
of President Kennedy for being too 
anti-union. 
A high school personality test 
suggested that Stiglitz would do 
well as a rabbi. He didn't go off 
in that direction, but at Amherst 
College, where he headed for his 
undergraduate studies, he quickly 
gained a reputation as a formida¬
ble debater and expositor. He also 
made a fateful decision to switch 
from physics to economics, a sub¬
ject in which his prodigious tal¬
ent soon became obvious. Barry 
Nalebuff, a Yale University professor 
and Stiglitz collaborator, says: "Like 
Rabbi Hil le l , Joe can explain what 
you need to know about economics 
while standing on one foot; the rest 
is commentary." 
Realizing Stiglitz's potential, his 
professors encouraged him to leave 
Amherst after his third year and 
start graduate work elsewhere; they 
were nevertheless devastated to see him go. "Frankly, see¬
ing Stiglitz leave is like watching the disappearance of one's 
right arm," one of them wrote. The Massachusetts Institute 
of Technology (MIT) , however, was overjoyed to get him as 
a student. The institution's admissions committee sent his 
information to the economics department and asked what 
the amount of his stipend should be, listing choices ranging 
from no stipend to $12,000. The professor assessing Stiglitz's 
application scribbled on the folder: "Offer h im Department 
Head's salary." 
Paper chase 
A few weeks into his stay at M I T he had already produced 
his first academic paper. The 1965 paper—Stiglitz was 22 
then—challenged Karl Marx's claim that European nations 
had needed colonies to provide a market for their excess pro¬
duction of goods at home. Stiglitz argued that the colonies 
were more important as an avenue for investment opportu¬
nities; without them, entrepreneurs would have run out of 
high-return opportunities at home. Colonization was a way 
of making the property rights associated with those foreign 
investments secure. And , more important, the colonizer could 
shape the direction of the colony's investment so that it would 
not compete with its home industry—England, for instance, 
kept India from investing in textiles. It was an early indica¬
tion of Stiglitz's sympathy for economically underprivileged 
nations—a cause that today has him railing against rich na¬
tions' agricultural subsidies to their rich farmers, which hold 
back competition from poorer farmers everywhere. 
"Stiglitz 'remains a professor, not a 
player . . . . And yet, somehow, the 
issues he cares about most always 
make it onto the agenda.'" 
In the 1960s, M I T was the center of a revolution in eco¬
nomics. "The department placed mathematics—not philoso¬
phy or ideology—at the heart of policy analysis," says Stiglitz, 
but it sought to bring about "an interface of careful math¬
ematical models and the practical problems of the economic 
world." Stiglitz went on to excel at this work, so much so that 
M I T made him an offer right away on his graduation. The 
job came with strings attached, though. Stiglitz had to agree 
to sleep in an apartment instead of his office—MIT wanted 
to see a lease as proof that he had an apartment—and to 
start wearing shoes around the office. M I T was not able to 
retain Stiglitz for long—over the next two decades his wan¬
derlust took h im to Cambridge, Yale, Oxford, Stanford, and 
Princeton—but M I T was right about his potential. Stiglitz 
unleashed an intellectual effort that earned him the 1979 
John Bates Clark medal—awarded to the most influential 
U.S. economist under the age of 40—and made him a shoo-
in for a Nobel Prize. 
A list of the most influential articles in economics has six 
papers by Stiglitz, an honor that he shares with only two oth¬
ers, Robert Barro (see F&D, September 2007) and Eugene 
Fama. A common theme in his papers is the difficulty in get¬
ting markets to function properly when information is costly 
to acquire or when the parties involved in a transaction are 
not equally informed. 
In a 1981 paper with Andrew Weiss, Stiglitz gave a pow¬
erful demonstration of how credit markets could malfunc¬
tion when this was the case. In the textbook model of credit 
markets, interest rates work to bring about balance between 
supply and demand; if there is too much demand for credit 
relative to supply, interest rates rise to cut off the demand of 
some of the borrowers. But what if lenders don't know which 
of their borrowers will work hard at their projects and repay 
the loan and which are going to shirk and simply hope that 
good fortune will enable them to pay off the loan? If there is 
excess demand for credit, raising the interest rate discourages 
the hard-working borrowers but not those who are intending 
to take a gamble with the loan. So, far from restoring balance 
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between supply and demand as in the textbook model, the 
rise in the interest rate actually ends up tilting the composi¬
tion of borrowers toward the undesirable type. Nalebuff says 
the Stiglitz-Weiss paper shows that "who you end up lending 
money to or what they do with that loan changes with the 
interest rate you charge . . . . Or, as Groucho Marx might have 
said: 'I wouldn't want to lend money to anyone who would 
borrow at that interest rate.'" The Stiglitz-Weiss paper helped 
develop a more realistic description of credit markets by 
showing why lenders might engage in credit rationing (i.e., 
limit the volume of loans) rather than raise the interest rate. 
In other papers, Stiglitz showed that such information 
gaps could also plague labor markets. In the textbook model, 
the wage rate is the lever that eliminates unemployment by 
moving up or down as needed to balance out the demand 
and supply of labor. But, just as in the credit market, there 
are informational deficiencies. Employers often lack accu¬
rate information about which of their workers wil l give the 
proverbial 110 percent to their job and which are inclined to 
shirk. They could of course monitor their employees to deter¬
mine who's been working hard and who's been merely saying 
so. But such monitoring is costly in terms of the employer's 
time and can lower employee morale. 
Employers, Stiglitz argued, are therefore likely to use the 
wage rate as a tool to separate workers from shirkers. They 
may offer a wage higher than the going market rate as an 
incentive to induce hard work from those who are willing 
and able to supply it. Paying a wage higher than the compe¬
tition means that the good workers have something to lose 
if their jobs are terminated; they thus have an incentive to 
work hard. But with wages set above a competitive level, 
the wage rate no longer acts a lever to eliminate unemploy¬
ment. In fact, as Stiglitz demonstrated in a 1984 paper with 
Carl Shapiro, unemployment is necessary as a "disciplining 
device" to keep workers from shirking. 
Stiglitz also questioned how well stock markets could work 
when their information was costly to acquire. A tenet of the 
textbook model of stock markets is that stock prices accu¬
rately reflect all publicly available information. But in a 1980 
paper with Sandy Grossman, Stiglitz presented a paradox. If 
prices reflect all the market information perfectly, then no one 
should bother to collect information because they can get it 
for free from the prices. But if no one bothers to collect infor¬
mation, then prices reveal no information. "The paradox lays 
the basis for the argument that imperfect information is likely 
to be the rule, rather than the exception," says Nalebuff. 
Throughout his career, Stiglitz has written more than 600 
articles—his C V runs to 60 pages—with over 100 coauthors. 
Nobel Laureate and New York Times columnist Paul Krugman 
says Stiglitz is "an insanely great economist—almost every 
time you dig into some sub-field of economics . . . you find 
that much of the work rests on a seminal Stiglitz paper." 
Turbulent academic 
In 1993, Stiglitz abandoned his comfortable perch in academia 
for the rough-and-tumble of the policy world. He became a 
member of Clinton's C E A and later its chairman. Alan Blinder, 
a Princeton professor and a fellow C E A member, describes it 
as "a gutsy move for a purely academic superstar." Stiglitz was 
instrumental in pushing through several initiatives, includ¬
ing persuading a somewhat reluctant U.S. Treasury to issue 
inflation-indexed government debt. But Chait wrote in The 
American Prospect that Stiglitz's style of argument—making 
his case publicly even after losing internal debates on issues— 
led to wintry relationships with other presidential advisors, 
such as Larry Summers. Blinder says politely that "Joe's be¬
havior . . . might perhaps be considered a little quixotic." 
"Stiglitz was instrumental in pushing 
through several initiatives, including 
persuading a somewhat reluctant 
U.S. Treasury to issue inflation-
indexed government debt." 
This style grew even more pronounced after Stiglitz moved 
in 1997 from the White House to become World Bank chief 
economist. He was critical of the economic advice to the 
transition economies to carry out a speedy move to mar¬
kets and capitalism. Stiglitz favored a much more gradual 
move, with legal and institutional reforms needed to sup¬
port a market economy preceding the transition to mar¬
kets. Kenneth Rogoff, a Harvard professor and former chief 
economist of the IMF, doubts that Stiglitz's approach would 
have succeeded. He says it is "unlikely that market institu¬
tions could have been developed in a laboratory setting and 
without actually starting the messy transition to the market." 
Rogoff adds that because the institutions underpinning com¬
munism had collapsed, "some new institutions had to be cre¬
ated quickly," and it is inevitable that mistakes were made in 
this haste. But "institutions take a long time to nurture and 
the ones that are there today, however imperfect, might well 
not be there if the effort had not been started" immediately 
when communism fell. 
During the financial crisis of 1997-98, Stiglitz publicly 
criticized the programs put together by the I M F and the gov¬
ernments of some Asian countries. Stiglitz argued that rais¬
ing interest rates to defend the currencies in these countries 
was counterproductive: the high interest rates reduced con¬
fidence in the economy by increasing loan defaults and cor¬
porate bankruptcies. Not everyone agreed with Stiglitz. The 
late M I T economist Rudiger Dornbusch defended the high-
interest-rate strategy as essential to restoring confidence, add¬
ing that "no finance minister wil l opt for the Stiglitz Clinic of 
Alternative Medicine. They [will] have the ambulance rush 
them to the IMF." J. Bradford DeLong, a noted macroecono¬
mist at the University of California, Berkeley, wrote that fol¬
lowing "Stiglitz's prescriptions [to] lend more with fewer 
conditions and have the government print more money to 
keep interest rates low . . . would have been overwhelmingly 
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likely . . . to end in hyperinflation or in a much larger-scale 
financial crisis as the falling value of the currency eliminated 
every firm's and bank's ability to repay its hard [foreign] cur¬
rency debt." 
After exiting the World Bank in 1999, Stiglitz repaired to 
Columbia University and wrote what became a best-selling 
book titled Globalization and Its Discontents. Many reviewers 
of the book noted that its narrative power came from having 
a clear villain: the IMF. The book's references to the I M F — 
almost all critical—totaled 340. Tom Dawson, the IMF's 
external relations head at the time, quipped: "That works out 
to over one alleged mistake committed by the I M F per page. 
You'd think by sheer accident we'd have gotten a couple of 
things right." 
"The game isn't over" 
Stiglitz does think the I M F got some things right in the finan¬
cial crisis of 2007-08: "The I M F is much better than it was in 
the past, absolutely. It has changed in many ways, and I think 
everybody needs to recognize it," he told The Miami Herald 
this year. At the annual meetings of the I M F and the World 
Bank in Istanbul, Stiglitz commended the IMF's support for 
a global fiscal stimulus and its view that there would be costs 
to an early withdrawal of the stimulus. "It's a repositioning of 
the I M F from what it has been historically," he told The Wall 
Street Journal. 
Stiglitz sees the fallout from the financial crisis as vindicat¬
ing his academic work and what he has been saying in policy 
circles for decades. In papers written in the mid-1980s with 
his Columbia colleague Bruce Greenwald, Stiglitz described 
how changes in financial and credit conditions are important 
in the propagation of the business cycle. U.S. Federal Reserve 
Board Chairman Ben Bernanke said in a July 2007 speech 
that the work of Stiglitz and others "gave economists the 
tools to think about the central role of financial markets in 
the real economy" and led to a better understanding of how 
"extreme disruptions of the normal functioning of financial 
markets . . . seem often to have a significant impact on the 
real economy," as happened, for instance, during the Great 
Depression. 
Only a month after that speech, Bernanke and policymak¬
ers around the globe became engaged in fighting a finan¬
cial crisis whose effects on the economy threatened to rival 
those of the Great Depression. The crisis has led to calls for 
reforms, including curbs on bankers' pay and more regula¬
tion of derivatives markets. To Stiglitz, an important reform 
would be to bring back the 1933 Glass-Steagall Act, which 
had separated commercial and investment banks. He had 
fought against repeal of the act in 1999, fearing that it would 
lead to the kind of financial meltdown that occurred in 
2007-08. "When repeal of Glass-Steagall brought commercial 
and investment banks together, the investment-bank culture 
came out on top," Stiglitz wrote. 
Despite the financial crisis, Stiglitz remains optimistic 
about the future of markets and capitalism. In contrast to 
"the 19th century owner-operated capitalism, in the 21st cen¬
tury capitalism wil l be operated by the people," he says. But 
to make it a success, people have to be more economically 
literate and there has to be greater civic participation in 
economic policymaking. Wi th these goals in mind, Stiglitz 
founded the Initiative for Policy Dialogue (IPD) in 2000—a 
global network of economists, political scientists, and policy¬
makers that studies complex economic issues and provides 
policy alternatives to countries. IPD also conducts workshops 
to enable the media and civil society to participate effectively 
in policy circles. Dawson applauded the effort: "It's a tough 
business—you almost have to be a Bono to have an impact 
on policy." 
Indeed, to reach wider audiences, Stiglitz has branched 
out into film with a documentary called Around the World 
with Joseph Stiglitz about how the fruits of capitalism can be 
shared more equally. W i l l it give filmmaker Michael Moore 
a run for his money? "No," laughs Stiglitz, "I think Moore is 
very effective," but "frustration doesn't do any good." 
Unlike Moore, Stiglitz says he hasn't lost his "Midwestern 
optimism" that things improve over the long run. Many 
people, he says, express their dismay to h im that, with the 
financial crisis barely over, the bankers and their boosters 
seem to be back calling the shots. But i f genuine reform of 
the financial system is not undertaken, "there is a reasonable 
risk of another crisis within 10-15 years, and the likelihood 
that the banks wil l win the next round is lower." Every cri¬
sis provides "an impetus for deeper democratic reform. The 
game isn't over." • 
Prakash Loungani is an Advisor in the IMF's Research 
Department. 
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